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Restorative Justice in Federal Sentencing: An Unexpected
Benefit of Booker?
Erik Luna* and Barton Poulson**
I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker' ended a standard
practice in federal sentencing and may yet inspire a more fundamental change to
the way punishment is approached in United States district courts. As originally
formulated and interpreted, the federal scheme-the United States Sentencing
Guidelines-set narrow, mandatory ranges of punishment based on the crime of
conviction, the offender's prior criminal history, and a limited number of
additional considerations, including facts that could substantially enhance an
offender's sentence. The prosecutor need only prove such facts by a
preponderance of the evidence to the sentencing judge, and the court would be
bound to increase the punishment accordingly. In a bifurcated, dual-majority
decision, Booker ruled that this practice was unconstitutional.
The first majority opinion applied to the federal system a line of cases that
had held that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury requires that all facts
necessary for a given punishment (other than a prior conviction) be admitted by
the defendant or proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.2 It was thus
impermissible for the Guidelines to demand greater punishment based on facts
that had not been conceded by the defendant or found true by a jury. The second
opinion resolved the constitutional infirmity by excising a pair of statutory
provisions, thereby rendering the Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory for
sentencing judges and establishing a standard of reasonableness for appellate
review of punishment.' Federal judges were now permitted to sentence
defendants outside of the tight ranges prescribed by the Guidelines and to
consider factors that were verboten prior to Booker.
In the immediate aftermath, some commentators were "ecstatic" and "elated"
with "a wise and careful decision," ending two decades of "unjust, irrational
sentences" and replacing them with a "marvelous" and "ideal sentencing system"
where "federal judges can be federal judges again. 4 Others described Booker as
*
Hugh B. Brown Chair in Law and Professor of Law, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of
Law; Co-Director, Utah Criminal Justice Center.
** Assistant Professor of Psychology, Behavioral Science Department, Utah Valley State College. We
wish to thank David Nuffer and Alice Ristroph for their comments.
1. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
2. See id. at 245 (merits majority); see also Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
3. See Booker, 536 U.S. at 259 (remedial majority).
4. See Mark Hamblett, Defense Lawyers Hail Sentencing Decisions, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 13, 2005, at 1; Carl
Hulse & Adam Liptak, New Fight Over Controlling Punishments is Widely Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at
A29; Tony Mauro, Sentence Fragment, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at 1.
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a "disaster," an "egregious overreach," and "a retreat from justice that may put
the public's safety in jeopardy," portending "grave effects" on the prosecution of
"drug trafficking, gangs, corporate fraud and terrorism offenses," and virtually
guaranteeing that "chaos will reign in federal courthouses."5
With the passage of time, however, the Supreme Court's decision has proven
to be neither miraculous nor catastrophic,6 although the jury is still out, so to
speak, as the lower courts sort through lingering questions and various legislative
"fixes" continue to be bandied about.7 If nothing else, Booker has inspired a
stream of scholarship in legal journals focusing on, among other things, the
history of American sentencing law, the legitimacy of the Guidelines regime, the
role of various criminal justice actors in setting punishment, the impact on
charging and plea bargaining decisions, and, most importantly, the return of
judicial discretion in sentencing.'
These and other topics are all exceptionally important for the future of the
federal system, and the scholarship to date has been rich and exciting. But
Booker also provides an opportunity to take a fresh look at the very reasons for
punishment and the methods used to determine and impose criminal penalties. As
United States District Court Judge Nancy Gertner wrote a few years ago, "[a]ll
experimentation with alternatives to incarceration and innovative approaches to
sentencing, like restorative justice, was necessarily squelched" by the Guidelines
regime. 9 Recently, however, she noted that "United States v. Booker could well
herald a new era in American sentencing practices"'-and among these
possibilities, we believe, is one Judge Gertner had expressly mentioned before:
the idea of restorative justice in the federal system. Our symposium contribution
hopes to begin this discussion, explaining what restorative justice is, how it might
be implemented in United States district courts, and why criminal justice actors
and others should support the concept of federal restorative justice.

5. See Hamblett, supra note 4; Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Defends Tough Politics,WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2005,
at A2; Implications of the Booker/Fanfan Decisionfor the FederalSentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 21
(2005) (prepared statement of Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Att'y Gen.), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/press-room/testimony/2005_3785_fedSentencAfterBooker02lO05.pdf (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
6. To the contrary, a preliminary report found that Booker has had a limited impact on federal sentences.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL
SENTENCING (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.ussc.gov/bookerreportBookerReport.pdf (on file with the

McGeorge Law Review).
7. See, e.g., Is a Booker Fix Needed?, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 291 (2005); Erik Luna, Gridland: An
Allegorical Critique of FederalSentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 25 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Symposium, A More Perfect System: Twenty-Five Years of Guidelines Sentencing Reform,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2005).
9. Nancy Gertner, FederalSentencing Guidelines:A View From the Bench, HUM. RTS., Spring 2002, at 7.
10. Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569,571(2005).
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II. WHAT

IS RESTORATIVE JUSTICE?

The phrase "restorative justice" appears in a grand total of three reported
federal opinions. One case uses the term in the context of an employment
discrimination claim and another applies it to equitable remedies in a wrongful
death suit, both more than a quarter-century old and neither having any relevance
to criminal justice." The third opinion, written by United States District Court
Judge Jack Weinstein, cited restorative justice scholarship in discussing the
history of restitution. 2 He then noted that modem federal law "has increased the
obligation of courts to consider the victims' need for emotional healing and
financial compensation within the context of criminal law," with the "special
interests [of victims] evaluated separately from those of the government."'"
Beyond these references, the federal courts have had nothing to say about
restorative justice, which is not altogether surprising given the stultifying effect
of the pre-Booker mandatory Guidelines regime. The following sections will
define the theory, principles, and practices of restorative justice, as well as
provide a brief, preliminary sketch of how restorativism might be adopted in the
federal system.
A.

The Theory and Principlesof Restorative Justice

Restorative justice can be defined as an approach to sentencing that
incorporates all stakeholders in a specific crime-the offender, the victim, family
members, community representatives, and other interested parties-in a process
of group decision-making on how to respond to the crime and its implications for
the future. 4 As a unique sanctioning philosophy, restorativism is often compared
to two leading theories of punishment: utilitarianism and retributivism.
Utilitarianism imposes criminal penalties only to the extent that the social
benefits of punishment outweigh the costs. It is a "consequentialist," forwardlooking approach, concerned with the consequences of punishment and, in
particular, reducing future crime and the accompanying damage to society.

11. See Lewis v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 615 F.2d 1129, 1130 (5th Cir. 1980); Weber v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 225-27 (5th Cir. 1977).
12. See United States v. Ferranti, 928 F. Supp. 206, 220-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
13. Id. at 221. It might also be noted that one reported case cited to an article on restorative justice but
only in regard to opposition to mandatory minimum sentences. See United States v. Harris, 165 F.3d 1277, 1281
n.2 (9th Cir. 1999). In addition, two unreported cases referred to restorative justice. In a military appeal, the
reviewing court upheld the trial judge's refusal to admit a pamphlet on restorative justice during sentencing. See
United States v. Wilson, 1997 WL 1420945 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1997). And in a civil rights suit against New
York State's Sing Sing Prison, the district court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to reinstitute a restorative
justice-based workshop canceled by corrections authorities. See West v. Keane, 1997 WL 266977 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
14. See, e.g., Erik Luna, Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1,
3 (2003); see also John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts, 25
CRIME & JUST. 1, 5 (1999).
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Among others, utilitarian goals include deterring the offender from further
criminality and rehabilitating him 5 toward a pro-social lifestyle. In contrast,
retributivism is a "non-consequentialist" theory, focused on past acts and mental
states irrespective of what may ensue from criminal penalties. As such, the
retributive approach is backward-looking, imposing punishment on the offender
solely because he deserves it, not because it produces desirable social
consequences. The traditional aim of retributivism is providing the offender his
"just deserts," a sanction that is morally commensurate to the offense, no more,
no less. Despite disparate objectives, utilitarianism and retributivism have one
key aspect in common: a narrow focus on the offender to the exclusion of all
others.
Unlike these traditional theories, restorative justice recognizes that a
successful criminal sanction must be both backward-looking--condemning the
offense and uncovering its causes-and forward-looking-making amends to the
victim and the general community while actively facilitating moral development
and pro-social behavior in the offender. Restorative justice thereby expands
punishment theory along two dimensions: the timeline of offending and the
stakeholders concerned with crime. It seeks the involvement of all affected
parties, not merely the state and the offender, to address what has happened and
what should happen. Metaphorically, it views crime as a point in the middle of a
motion picture, with action both before and after the criminal event, rather than a
snapshot without the context of the past or a vision for the future.
Over the years, restorative justice has been subject to numerous definitions
by scholars and practitioners. 6 Moreover, it can be separated into (at least) two
distinct conceptions-one that views restorativism as a substantive theory
challenging retributivism, utilitarianism, and other philosophies of punishment;
and another that sees restorative justice as a procedural approach to the criminal
sanction that allows all legitimate sentencing theories, as represented by affected
stakeholders, to have a say in the decision-making process and ultimate
outcome. 7 For present purposes, however, it is not necessary to dwell on
different definitions of restorative justice or conceptions of restorativism.
Although such points can be important," it is enough for now to emphasize the
differences between restorative justice in general and the prevailing methodology
in the United States.

15. To avoid confusion, we use male pronouns in this article. Cf. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory,
Holism, and the ProceduralConception of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 209 n. 11 (2003). Also,
any reference to a singular offender and/or victim is for rhetorical convenience.
16. See, e.g., id. at 227-28.
17. See, e.g., id. at 288-90.
18. See infra note 117 and accompanying text (discussing difference between values conception and
procedural conception of restorative justice).
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In particular, restorative justice incorporates three basic principles that
distinguish it from America's standard approach to punishment. '9 First, crime is
not just an action against the state but against specific victims and the relevant
community. Offending is refrained as a violation of social relationships that also
violates the law, with the source of pro-social norms and crime control located in
families, support networks, and communities, rather than penal codes and courts.
With this in mind, restorative justice promotes the active involvement of victims,
families, community representatives, and other interested parties to deal with the
causes and effects of crime.
Second, a central ambition of restorativism is making amends for the
offense-especially for the physical, emotional, and economic harm to the
victim-instead of imposing pain upon the offender. This approach delineates
accountability as an offender acknowledging the wrongfulness of his behavior,
communicating remorse for the damage he has caused, and taking actions to
mend the breach in social relationships. Restorativism contends that crime
creates affirmative duties that the offender must meet with an active response
instead of passive submission to some penalty.
Finally, restorative justice envisions a collaborative sanctioning process that
involves all stakeholders concerned with the offender and the offense. The
primary feature is largely uninhibited dialogue among the parties, allowing all
present to express their emotions and ideas in an open forum. Through discussion
and deliberation, restorative justice contemplates mutual agreement on the steps
that must be taken to heal the victim and the community, resulting in the
formation of a plan to confront the factors contributing to the offender's conduct
and to facilitate his development as a law-abiding citizen.
Restorative justice thus questions the very underpinnings of contemporary
approaches to criminal punishment. An offense is not merely a "breach of the
King's peace," to use the historical term, but a direct violation of the victim's
rights and interests, a grave concern to loved ones (both of the victim and of the
offender), and a threat to the community. Although state intervention stems the
brutality of a private settling of scores, the modem criminal justice system is
premised not on public intercession but government domination, often drastically
limiting the input of affected parties or wholly excluding them from the process.
Restorative justice recognizes that the victim, families, and community members
have, in Nils Christie's words, a type of "property" interest in the case as a matter
of process and outcome. °
Moreover, the crime itself cannot be isolated or reduced to a problem with
the criminal. There is context to offending, a history surrounding the event, and
thoughtful solutions to crime will not focus on the offender alone. Although the
wrongdoing must be firmly denounced and the nature of the harm made clear to

19.
20.

See, e.g., Luna, supra note 15, at 228-29.
See Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 1 (1977).
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the perpetrator, restorative justice argues that the needs of the victim must be
addressed as well, including repairing any harm caused by the offense. In
addition, the community should undergo some reflection: Did the social
environment contribute to the offending and, if so, how are the relevant
criminogenic influences remedied? What must be done to regain a sense of
security and reaffirm pro-social values? How can the community and its
members facilitate the moral education and social integration of the offender?
These questions are not asked as a means to exonerate a defendant for his
harmful wrongdoing, but instead to restore the community's sense of well-being
and to take affirmative, prophylactic steps against future offending.
B. The Practiceof Restorative Justice
In its practical applications, restorative justice has slowly emerged in many
Western nations, with programs such as victim-offender mediation, sentencing
circles, and family group conferences implemented or tested in Australia, Britain,
Canada, New Zealand, and even the United States. 2' For example, victimoffender mediation programs have existed for more than two decades, typically
employed for property crimes but also increasingly used for certain serious and
violent offenses. In most jurisdictions, the cases are referred for mediation as a
form of diversion from prosecution 22 or as a condition of probation after an
accepted guilty plea. Both the offender and the victim must agree to participate in
the program, with the mediator establishing contact with each party, explaining
the process and setting an acceptable time and safe location for the meeting.
Although procedures vary, the victim usually speaks first during a victimoffender mediation, describing the crime's impact on his life, such as the physical
and emotional harm and financial loss caused by the event. The process also
provides an opportunity to ask any questions about the offense and offender that
may have remained with or even haunted the victim. In turn, the offender is
provided a chance to tell his story, to explain the circumstances of the crime as

21. See, e.g., Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative Conferencing
Models, JUV. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 1; JOHN BELGRAVE, N.Z. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE: A DISCUSSION PAPER § 5.2.3 (1996), available at http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/1996/
restorative (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). As noted by leading restorative justice scholars, these
programs often go by different titles. See, e.g., Bazemore & Umbreit, supra, at 2, 6 (noting alternative names
for "victim-offender mediation" and "circle sentencing"); Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the
Twenty-First Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 269-70
(2005) [hereinafter Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century] (noting different names for
"victim-offender mediation," "group conferencing," and "circles").
22. The term "diversion" can be defined quite broadly. See, e.g., Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan,
Legislatingfor Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 53, 69 (1998). We will use this term to refer to a
procedure by which an offender is removed from the formal court system at an early stage in the criminal
process-for instance, pretrial diversion whereby individuals who do not contest their guilt avoid the filing of a
formal case by agreeing to participate in and successfully completing particular programs. See, e.g., WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.3(h) (2005).
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well as his past and potential future, and most importantly, to apologize and
accept responsibility for the offense. Through facilitated dialogue, the victim and
offender can discuss and possibly reach an appropriate outcome, such as an
agreement that the offender will provide restitution for property damage and
volunteer for community service. Depending on the jurisdiction and legal posture
of the underlying case, a mediator, probation officer, or program personnel may
follow up to ensure that the offender is making progress and meeting his
obligations under the agreement.23
Family group conferencing also employs facilitated dialogue, but it expands
the prospective participants and collective decision-making beyond the limited
number of parties included in dyad-based mediation programs. Cases referred for
conferences may come as a type of diversion-although New Zealand uses
family group conferencing throughout its juvenile justice system, whether in lieu
of formal charges or in response to admissions or verdicts of guilt in all but the
most serious offenses (e.g., homicide). In general, the coordinator will consult
with the victim, the offender, their families and supporters, social service
providers, law enforcement officials, and other stakeholders to determine who
should be invited to participate and when and where the conference should be
held. The coordinator is also responsible for informing the invited parties about
the relevant background of the offense, how the conference will likely proceed,
and any other information necessary for voluntary, knowledgeable participation.
A conference typically begins with an introduction of the participants and a
coordinator's description of the ensuing steps in the process. A law enforcement
representative may summarize the offense, and the parties will have a chance to
comment on the factual synopsis. The victim then has the opportunity to discuss
his feelings about the crime, its consequences, and possible outcomes of the
conference, and to ask questions about the offense and other issues of
importance-followed by similar opportunities for the offender and other
participants to express their views. After open dialogue about the crime and
general discussion of available options, the process seeks negotiation on and
formulation of a mutually agreed upon plan for the offender (e.g., providing
restitution, engaging in community service, undergoing counseling, etc.). In the
New Zealand model, the coordinator is responsible for following up on the
offender's advancement and checking that the conditions of the conference plan
are being met.24

23.

See, e.g., Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 21, at 2-3, 7-12; see also MARK

UMBREIT, VICTIM

MEETS OFFENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN MEDIATION (1994).

24.

See, e.g.,

GABRIELLE M. MAXWELL & ALLISON MORRIS, FAMILY, VICTIMS AND CULTURE: YOUTH

JUSTICE IN NEW ZEALAND (1993); Joy Wundersitz & Sue Hetzel, Family Group Conferencing for Young
Offenders, in FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCES: PERSPECTIVES ON POLICY AND PRACTICE 126 (Joy Wundersitz

ed., 1996); Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 21, at 5-6, 7-12;
at 295-301.

BELGRAVE,

supra note 21; Luna, supra note 15,
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Circle sentencing expands the participants even further, adding numerous
community members and possibly judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and
relevant court personnel. The basic methodology uses a variation on the decisionand peace-making practices of indigenous cultures around the globe, including
the First Nations people of Canada and Native American tribes such as the
Navajo. A circle may be employed as an alternative to the traditional sentencing
hearing after an offender has pled to or been found guilty of the underlying
offense. Pursuant to one version of this model, the offender applies to participate
in a circle, with the decision made by a community justice committee and
affected parties. If the case is accepted, committee members will meet separately
with the offender and victim and help establish support groups for both
individuals.
The participants will gather together at a convenient time and place and will
literally sit in a circle facing one another. The facilitator is known as a "keeper,"
who begins the session with an introduction and description of the process to be
followed. In particular, sentencing circles pass a "talking piece" (i.e., a small
item of symbolic value) from one participant to another, signifying the item's
holder as the person whose turn it is to speak and requiring that all others
respectfully listen. Each speaker is thus provided an uninterrupted opportunity to
express his feelings about the crime, the parties, and potential resolutions. As the
talking piece moves around the circle, often multiple times, the process allows all
participants to meaningfully contribute to the discussion, to better understand
their fellow contributors and the incident in question, and to reach a consensus on
an appropriate sentencing plan. It also invests the participants in a successful
outcome, with members of the justice committee and support groups following
up on the sentencing circle and assuring that the offender is abiding by the plan
(possibly by convening additional circles).25
Although diverse in format and usage, as well as having distinct advantages
and limitations,26 all of these programs are premised on an admission or finding
of guilt on the part of the offender and the freely chosen, fully informed
participation of all parties. Each model utilizes non-adversarial, informal
procedures and provides the participants with a degree of process control over
place, time, and format. Moreover, the programs tend to empower those people
directly touched by the crime, allowing them to openly discuss their feelings and
ideas-the victim explaining how the crime has changed his life, for instance,

25.

See, e.g., KAY PRANIS, BARRY STUART & MARK WEDGE, PEACEMAKING CIRCLES: FROM CRIME TO

COMMUNITY (2003); Barry Stuart, Circle Sentencing: Turning Swords into Ploughshares, in RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 193 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996); Janelle Smith,
Peacemaking Circles: The "Original" Dispute Resolution of Aboriginal People Emerges as the "New"

Alternative Dispute Resolution Process, 24 IAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 329 (2003); Bazemore & Umbreit,
supra note 21, at 6-7, 7-12; see also Robert Yazzie & James W. Zion, Navajo Restorative Justice: The Law of
Equality and Justice, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 157; Robert Yazzie, "Hozho Nahasdlii"-We
Are Now in Good Relations: Navajo Restorative Justice, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 117 (1996).

26.

See generally Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 21.
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and what is needed to make things better-thereby contributing to a
collaborative, consensus-based decision-making process. In drawing upon all
involved to reach an appropriate resolution, the goal is not merely to impose a
painful sanction but instead to engage the offender in a moral dialogue about the
wrongfulness of his conduct, to provide him the opportunity to take responsibility
and express remorse, and to repair the damage and meet the needs of those
injured by the offense.
The models (especially family group conferencing and circle sentencing) also
emphasize support networks for the victim and offender, surrounding the most
vulnerable parties with people who are concerned about their well-being. This
social support may be particularly important in addressing the offender and his
offense. In restorative programs, the focus is always on the wrongfulness of the
crime and the harm to the victim and community-but it is the offense, not the
offender, that is placed at the center of discussion. The attendance of supporters
gives the process credence while ensuring that positive identities-as a family
member, neighbor, employee, artist, student-athlete, and so forth-are reinforced
by the presence and words of those who care most about the offender. And
consistent with substantive restorativism, these programs strive to reintegrate the
offender back into the law-abiding community. Rather than simply labeling him
an outcast and forcing him to bear a badge of inferiority, restorative justice
aspires to bring the offender back into the community and to help him become a
contributing member of society.27
C. Restorative Justice in the FederalSystem
How might restorativism be employed in federal criminal justice? To be clear
from the outset, the aforementioned programs are not substitutes for many of the
core functions of the federal system. Restorative justice is not an investigative
tool for determining whether a crime has been committed and who is responsible,
and it certainly lacks the fact-finding apparatus of the traditional court process. In
other words, restorative-based programs can answer neither the "whodunit"
questions nor the myriad issues of culpability-whether an individual committed
the crime at issue, whether there is any merit to an affirmative defense like
mental illness or self-defense, whether the defendant is guilty of the highest
charged crime or a lesser included offense, and so on. Likewise, restorative
justice has no capacity to interpret the federal criminal code or the United States
Constitution, such as a claim that the statute of limitations bars prosecution, for
example, or that a government search violated the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights. But what the above programs do offer is an inclusive,
context-sensitive, holistic method for affected parties to tell their stories and

27. See infra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing reintegrative shaming versus stigmatizing
shaming).
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voice their concerns, to condemn the offense and provide the offender an
opportunity to express remorse, to discuss potential options that address the
needs of the victim and community, and to formulate a mutually agreed-upon
resolution.
Theoretically, these programs could have been implemented in the past as a
form of diversion prior to the filing of federal charges, but such an approach
would have been inconsistent with the charge-first mentality within the
prosecutorial ranks. In the words of one trial judge, the United States Department
of Justice is "addicted to plea bargaining to leverage... law enforcement
resources to an overwhelming conviction rate,"28 where the bargaining process
begins only after charges are pending. Any organization with an ethos of constant
victory, and the weaponry to ensure it, seems highly unlikely to consider nonadversarial alternative resolutions, even if they might serve the larger interests at
stake. In the case of federal prosecutors, the stiff penalties prescribed by the
Guidelines virtually guaranteed a conviction after charging, given that most
criminal defendants would accept a plea bargain and a lesser sentence rather than
take their chances in court at the risk of a long prison term. Due to the mandatory
nature of federal punishment, those defendants convicted at trial usually had no
recourse in the district court judge, who often was required to impose the
sentence under the Guidelines, no matter how unreasonable it might be and
irrespective of all other considerations. So whether by plea or conviction, the
resulting sentence was largely predetermined, unresponsive to the views of
affected lay parties, and unamenable to alternative resolutions.
As suggested at the beginning, however, the Supreme Court's decision in
Booker opens the door for new and progressive options beyond the confines of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, including the incorporation of
restorative justice programs. Because the Guidelines are no longer obligatory on
the district court, judges are not bound to the will of prosecutors through their
charging decisions and need not impose "a stiff penalty upon defendants who
exercise their constitutional right to trial by jury., 29 As a result, there are no
guaranteed sentences, possibly creating a different incentive structure for federal
prosecutors, one that encourages them to think about considerations other than
sheer conviction rates and cumulative prison terms.
Moreover, the very words of governing federal law and the Booker decision
itself seem to emphasize sentencing factors conducive to restorativism. By
excising the statutory provision that makes the Guidelines mandatory, sentencing
judges now must
take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals ....
[They should] consider the Guidelines sentencing range established
for.., the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable
28.
29.

United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2004).
Id. at 264.
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category of defendant, the pertinent Sentencing Commission policy
statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the
need to provide restitution to victims. And [judges should] impose
sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for
the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the
public, and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training and medical care.3"
Along these lines, restorative justice programs place great importance on
meeting the needs of crime victims and typically result in restitution agreements.
They also provide a forum for victims to express their emotions and opinions and
to ask lingering questions about the offense and offender. This may be all the
more relevant to the federal system with Congress' passage of the Crime
Victims' Rights Act and recent efforts to implement its provisions through the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 3 Although the Act makes no mention of
restorative justice, its emphasis on providing victims access to proceedings,
opportunities to be heard, and the right to be treated with fairness and respect,
among other things, is consistent with and can be supported by well-run
restorative programs.
In addition, restorativism can be effective at promoting respect for the law,
deterring future crime, and protecting the community. As detailed at length
elsewhere, the Guidelines utilize a cryptic jargon of "levels," "categories,"
"points," and "scores," while drawing seemingly hair-splitting differences
between, for instance, "minor" and "minimal" participation by an offender-with
the resulting numbers plugged into a sentencing equation and the offender's
future charted on a lifeless 258-box punishment grid.32 The entire sentencing
process is incomprehensible to the affected individuals (and even criminal justice
actors), lacking any type of clear moral reasoning for punishment. As a
consequence, the proceeding has virtually no intellectual or emotional value
other than to daze and confuse those individuals most intimately concerned about
the sentence.
In contrast, restorative justice programs seek to directly engage and
positively impact these individuals through the use of open dialogue and the flow
of personal narratives about the crime, the unambiguous condemnation of the
offense and the harm it has caused, the power of emotional bonds of family and
friends who want the offender to be a lawful, contributing member of society,
and the investment of the offender and others in his success. Moreover, those
most affected by the crime-the victim, family members, and community

30. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2005) (citations omitted).
31. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3771 (West Supp. 2005); Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal
Rules of CriminalProcedure: ProposedAmendments in Light of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 2006 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 835.

32.

See Luna, supra note 7.
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representatives-may be in the best position to gauge the seriousness of the
offense and determine a just punishment. And, of course, the offender and his
loved ones, in conjunction with social service providers, can best articulate his
educational, vocational, and medical needs.
Although a variety of options are possible, restorative justice programs might
be incorporated at two stages of the federal criminal process: (1) prior to
charging as a form of diversion; and (2) after a guilty plea or conviction as an
input for the sentencing judge. Federal restorative justice as diversion might
come into play after law enforcement has investigated the offense and
determined that a particular individual is responsible. Based on consultation with
the relevant agent, the victim, and other interested parties, the United States
Attorney would forego filing charges (or presenting the case to a grand jury) if
the offender enters into a restorative justice program and successfully completes
the resulting plan. In fairness to both sides and out of an abundance of caution,
this option might require (at a minimum):
(1) advice of counsel for the offender;
(2) a written agreement between the government and the offender;
(3) a stipulation that charges can be filed if no plan is reached during the
mediation, conference, circle, et cetera, or if the offender fails to
follow through with his obligations under the plan; and
(4) a stipulation (or possibly a new rule) that statements made by the
offender during the restorative process cannot be used against him in
a later prosecution.33
The post-plea/conviction option could be relatively straightforward. With the
consent of the court and the prosecutor, and with the voluntary participation of
the defendant, victim, and other interested parties, a facilitator would initiate a
restorative interaction prior to sentencing. Any plan that was reached through the
mediation, conference, circle, et cetera, would be provided to the district court for
its consideration in setting punishment. The participants could then attend the
sentencing hearing and convey their opinions about the program and resulting
plan (or failure to reach a plan), followed by the more standard factual and legal
claims by the prosecutor and defense attorney about an appropriate punishment.
Taking into account the relevant Guidelines range, the restorative plan, the
statements of participants, the arguments by counsel, and any other pertinent

33. The inadmissibility of statements made during a restorative justice meeting would be consistent with
the practice of family group conferences in New Zealand, see BELGRAVE, supra note 21, at §§ 4.2-4.3, as well
as the rule for negotiations in American civil and criminal cases and the best practice (if not legal standard) in
civil mediation. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11; FED. R. EVID. 408, 410; CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West Supp.
2006); UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT (2003), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/blllulc/mediat/2003final
draft.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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matters, the judge could deliver the sentence and its rationale to an informed
group that has participated in the process and feels invested in the outcome.
III. WHY RESTORATIVE JUSTICE?

Restorative justice offers a thoughtful response to crime that might be readily
adopted in United States district courts. But we recognize that any change to the
status quo of federal sentencing will have to do more than this-it has to provide
demonstrated, empirical benefits for those involved and society at large-a point
that may be especially true for restorative justice, given that its theory and
practice are seen as relatively new in the United States and perceived as
challenges to America's traditional approach to punishment. Restorativism can
surmount this hurdle, however, as studies show that the programs have
numerous, well-documented, salutary effects, from reducing fear experienced by
victims to lowering recidivism rates among offenders. Yet restorative approaches
may be able to do much more. Based on potential connections between
restorative justice studies and mental health research, we suggest that restorative
practices may attenuate the effects of psychopathologies and create situations
that
34
are more constructive for victims, offenders, and the larger community.
A.

Cognitive, Affective, and Behavioral Benefits

A recent review of the empirically verified benefits of restorative justice35
found that, relative to parties in traditional court processes, those who
participated in restorative programs were more likely to:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

believe that the criminal justice system was fair;
say that the mediator or judge had been fair;
rate the outcome of their proceedings as fair;
be satisfied with the way that their case was handled;
be satisfied with the outcome of the proceedings;
believe that they had been able to tell their stories during the
proceedings;
believe that their opinions were adequately considered;
believe that the offender had been held accountable;
have better perceptions of the other party's behavior; and
apologize to the victim/to forgive the offender.36

34.
The prevalence of mental illness among offenders would seem to increase
infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
35.
The analysis in this section comes from Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A
Research on the Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 167
selective review of victim-offender mediation and family group conferencing programs
Canada, England, and Australia.

the possibilities. See
Review of Empirical
(2003), which was a
in the United States,
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In addition, victims who participated in restorative programs tended to:
(11)
(12)

be less upset about crime; and
be less afraid of revictimization.37

Not only are the data favorable to restorative justice, but the results were
practically identical in each of the studies. The consistency of the data is
remarkable in light of the substantial variability of the studies, with restorativism
displaying clear, dependable benefits for almost all participants.38
In addition, restorative justice has two other important behavioral
advantages: increased reparations and decreased recidivism. Meta-analytic
findings show that offenders who participate in restorative programs have
substantially higher rates of completing their obligations (e.g., compensating
victims for property damage) than do traditionally processed offenders. 9 In one
study, for instance, 81% of restorative justice participants completed their
requirements, which was significantly more than the 57% of those not in the
victim-offender mediation program. 40 Another study compared average payments
from the two groups and found that restorative justice offenders paid between
95% and 1000% more than offenders in court.4' In general, completion of

36.
The odds ratios (i.e., the odds of agreement for restorative justice participants compared to the odds
of agreement for litigation participants) for these ten items for offenders were as follows: (1) OR = 2.7; (2) OR
= 6.0; (3) OR = 2.6; (4) OR = 1.9; (5) OR = 1.6; (6) OR = 4.1; (7) OR = 2.1; (8) OR = 4.8; (9) OR = 1.9; and
(10) OR = 6.9. The advantages of restorative justice for offenders were statistically significant for every
comparison except for Item 5, which was still in the direction favoring restorative justice. For victims, the odds
ratios were as follows: (1) OR = 3.4; (2) OR = 2.3; (3) OR = 2.6; (4) OR = 2.8; (5) OR = 2.3; (6) OR = 8.8; (7)
OR = 1.3; (8) OR = 4.9; (9) OR = 2.4; and (10) OR = 2.6. Every comparison for victims showed a statistically
significant advantage for restorative justice except Item 7, which was again in the direction favoring restorative
justice.
37. The odds ratios were as follows: (11) OR = 0.5; and (12) OR = 0.3. Both indicate statistically
significant advantages for restorative procedures.
38. Some of these findings have been substantiated in a recent meta-analysis of twenty-two published
studies that examined thirty-five restorative justice programs. Specifically, the authors found higher satisfaction
with restorative programs for both victims and offenders in all but one of the relevant studies. JEFF LATIMER ET
AL., THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PRACTICES: A META-ANALYSIS 9-12 (2001), available at
http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/rs/rep/2001/meta.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). For a qualitative
investigation of apology and remorse, see Susan J. Szmania & Daniel E. Mangis, Finding the Right Time and
Place: A Case Study Comparison of the Expression of Offender Remorse in TraditionalJustice and Restorative
Justice Contexts, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 335 (2005).
39. See LATIMER, supra note 38, at 12, 14; MARK S. UMBREIT ET AL., THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE
JUSTICE CONFERENCING: A REVIEW OF 63 EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN 5 COUNTRIES 8-10 (2002), available at
http://rjp.umn.edu/img/assets/13522/mpact_-RJC Review 63 Studies.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review) (providing reviews of studies on victim-offender mediation and family group conferencing).
40. MARK S. UMBREIT & ROBERT COATES, VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION: AN ANALYSIS OF
PROGRAMS IN FOUR STATES OF THE U.S. (1992).
41.

AUDREY EVIE & ROBERT CUSHMAN, A SUMMARY OF THE EVALUATIONS OF SIX CALIFORNIA

available at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/
pdffiles/vorp.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). It should be noted, however, that one study found no
difference, with both groups completing almost eighty percent of contracts. See Sudipto Roy, Two Types of
VICTIM OFFENDER REHABILITATION PROGRAMS (2000),

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37

agreements is significantly more common, and more bountiful, through
restorative processes.
Meta-analysis on the effects of restorative justice on recidivism was also
supportive. One study found that after a year, 28% of participants in traditional
sanctioning procedures had committed new crimes, compared to 19% of
participants in restorative programs, a statistically significant reduction of 32% ,42
while a second meta-analysis found a smaller but still significant impact on
recidivism.43 Interestingly, two other studies discovered that restorative practices
had the strongest effects on recidivism when the crimes were more severe.'
Research has also shown that among offenders who do reoffend, participants in
restorative justice tended to commit less serious crimes than other offenders.45 As
an empirical matter, then, it can be said that restorative justice outperforms
standard court processes in facilitating the completion of reparations for the
current offense and reducing the chance of future crime.
B. Potential Mental Health Benefits
In addition to these verified contributions of restorative justice to desirable
cognitive, affective, and behavioral outcomes, it is our belief that restorative
practices may help reduce mental health disorders among participants. This
would not be altogether surprising, as some leading scholars have suggested a
connection between restorative justice and "therapeutic jurisprudence, ' 6 a field
that examines law's influence on the psychological well-being of affected parties
through the production of therapeutic or anti-therapeutic effects. 47 Beyond
theoretical and conceptual commonalities-for example, that therapeutic

Juvenile Restitution Programs in Two Midwestern Counties: A Comparative Study, 57 FED. PROBATION 48

(1993).
42.

William Nugent et al., Participationin Victim-Offender Mediation and the Prevalence and Severity

of Subsequent Delinquent Behavior: A Meta-Analysis, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 137 (2003).
43. LATIMER, supra note 38, at 14-16.
44.

PAUL McCOLD & BENJAMIN WACHTEL, RESTORATIVE POLICING EXPERIMENT: THE BETHLEHEM

PENNSYLVANIA POLICE FAMILY GROUP CONFERENCING PROJECT

3-4, 51 (1998);

LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET

(RISE) 12 (2000).
45. William R. Nugent & Jeff Paddock, The Effect of Victim-Offender Mediation on Severity of
Reoffense, 12 MEDIATION Q. 353, 360 (1995).
46. See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 244
AL., RECIDIVISM PATTERNS IN THE CANBERRA REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING EXPERIMENTS

(2002); Thomas J. Scheff, Community Conferences: Shame and Anger in Therapeutic Jurisprudence,67 REV.

JUR. U.P.R. 97 (1998); see also Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within the
Comprehensive Law Movement, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: LAW AS A HELPING
PROFESSION 465 (Dennis P. Stolle etal. eds., 2000) (describing restorative justice and therapeutic jurisprudence

as "vectors" in a comprehensive law movement).
47. See, e.g., JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC

KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS

(Bruce

Winick & David Wexler eds., 2003); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce Winick eds., 1996); PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE,

supra note 46;

DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT

(19901: DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE I. WINICK. ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991

.
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jurisprudence and restorative justice "are both part of a return to problemoriented adjudication" 48 --there may be reason to believe that restorativism can
affirmatively improve the mental health of participants and possibly prevent the
most anti-therapeutic outcome of all, suicide. To date, just one randomized
experiment (for victims only) has been conducted on this topic, which found
some evidence for a reduction in post-traumatic stress symptoms among
restorative justice participants. 9 With this exception, there are no data available
that correspond to the findings above on the cognitive, affective, and behavioral
benefits of restorative justice. We believe that the potential link between
restorativism and mental health presents a new direction for research and could
offer yet another argument in favor of restorative practices.
Prelude on Suicide. The empirical impetus for this section was a study by
Doug Gray, a pediatric psychiatrist who specializes in youth suicide. Gray and
his colleagues found that for adolescent males in Utah, a single encounter with
the juvenile justice system doubled the odds of suicide, compared to non-referred
youths. 0 Moreover, seven or more referrals led to a five-fold increase in the odds
of suicide. In fact, of the 151 Utah youths to commit suicide during the study
period (1996-1999), nearly two-thirds (63%) had been referred to the juvenile
justice system, which was more than were enrolled in or graduated from school.
Although it is, at best, risky to generalize from juvenile delinquents in a state
system to adult offenders in the federal system, the possibility is too significant to
pass up. Could restorative justice reduce suicide and other mental health
problems in offenders?
The fact that appearing in court is a significant predictor for suicide makes
restorative justice relevant, given its reduced emphasis on formal, in-court
processes. And as noted above, restorative justice decreases repeat offending and
thus further court appearances.5 ' Still, the potential causal connection between
restorative justice and mental health is ambiguous. One of the purposes of this
symposium piece, therefore, is to suggest possible relationships between the two
based on existing empirical research. Although a complete discussion of the
etiology of psychopathology is beyond the scope of this article, there are some
pathogenic factors that restorative practices may be able to influence. These
factors include perceived control, problem-solving skills, social integration, and
procedural justice. We will focus our attention on these factors and, in particular,

48. Braithwaite, supra note 46, at 246.
49. Caroline M. Angel, Crime Victims Meet Their Offenders: Testing the Impact of Restorative Justice
Conferences on Victims' Post-Traumatic Stress Symptoms 74-78 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ.
of Pa.) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
50. Doug Gray et al., Utah Youth Suicide Study, Phase 1: Government Agency Contact Before Death,41
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 427 (2002).
51. See Nugent et al., supra note 42.
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their impact on depression" and anxiety," which are not only the two most
common forms of psychopathology but also significant predictors of suicide risk.
PotentialBenefits of GreaterPerceived Control. Some of the most influential
theories in explaining psychopathology have centered on the individual's sense
of control or perceived efficacy in bringing about desired changes. Originally
formulated to explain depression, some of the major theories have addressed
helplessness," hopelessness,55 the perceived contingency of outcomes on one's
behavior,56 and dysfunctional attributional styles. 7 A central component of all of
these theories is that the individual erroneously believes that he is no longer
capable of producing positive changes. Instead, the locus of control is placed in
powerful and, in the eyes of the perceiver, possibly malevolent others, such as
parents, employers, or the courts.
Extensive research supports the relationship between perceived control and
poor mental health. For instance, a meta-analysis of over 100 studies with nearly
15,000 participants found that depression was consistently associated with
internal, stable, and global attributions for negative (as compared to positive)
events." Similarly, a survey of over 10,000 adults found that perceptions of low
control at home or work during the initial testing period predicted increased
levels of depression and anxiety six years later. 9 Another study of 733
adolescents (twelve to fourteen years old) confirmed that the pattern generalizes
across age groups.' A pessimistic attributional style significantly predicted
higher levels of depression both at initial testing and in a follow-up evaluation.
These studies represent only a small sample of the research on perceived control
and poor mental health, but the link is empirically robust.

52. See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, DEPRESSION 1 (2000), available at
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/depression.cfm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that almost
ten percent of the adult American population will suffer from some form of depression in a twelve-month
period).
53.

See, e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, ANXIETY DISORDERS 1 (1994), available at

http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/anxiety.cfm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that eighteen
percent of the adult American population will suffer from some form of anxiety disorder in a given year).
54. See, e.g., Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and Reformulation, 87
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49 (1978).
55. See, e.g., Lyn Y. Abramson et al., Hopelessness Depression: A Theory Based-Subtype of
Depression, 96 PSYCHOL. REV. 358 (1989); Aaron Beck et al., The Measurement of Pessimism: The
Hopelessness Scale, 42 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 861 (1974).
56. See, e.g., John R. Weisz, & Deborah J. Stipek, Competence, Contingency, and the Development of
Perceived Control, 25 HUM. DEV. 250 (1982).
57. See, e.g., Martin E. P. Seligman et al., Depressive Attributional Style, 88 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL.
242 (1979).
58. Paul D. Sweeney et al., Attributional Style in Depression: A Meta-Analytic Review, 50 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 974 (1986).
59. Joan M. Griffin et al., The Importance of Low Control at Work and Home on Depression and
Anxiety: Do These Effects Vary by Gender and Social Class?, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 783 (2002).
60. Susan H. Spence et al., Problem-Solving Orientation and Attributional Style: Moderators of the
Impact of Negative Life Events on the Development of Depressive Symptoms in Adolescence?, 31 J. CLINICAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 219 (2002).
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Although no research appears to have addressed directly the effects of
restorative justice on hopefulness, helplessness, or attributional style (making
these areas ripe for future research), the perception of control has received some
attention. In one of the largest single evaluations of restorative justice practicesthe Reintegrative Shaming Experiments ("RISE") in Australia--offenders who
participated in family group conferences were more likely to feel that they had
some control over the outcome of the proceedings, that they had an opportunity
to express their views, that they had some control over the way things were run,
and that they were less likely to feel pushed around by others in power.6' While
limited, these results are promising and suggest that restorative practices may be
able to foster a greater sense of involvement and control over critical events than
provided by the traditional approach. This possibility is consistent with theories
of restorative justice 62 and alternative dispute resolution 63 that emphasize personal
involvement and commitment to the process of justice.
PotentialBenefits of GreaterProblem-Solving Skills. A second major area of
research into the predictors and causes of psychopathology has focused on the
individual's ability to solve the many dilemmas of life. For example, a negative
problem-solving orientation-that is, one that is characterized by passive,
avoidant, or self-destructive approaches to problems-was found to predict
higher levels of depression if the respondent suffered negative life events during
the preceding year.6 Similarly, a study of college students found that individuals
with poor problem-solving skills who earned low exam grades were more likely
to experience increased levels of depression and hopelessness as compared to
students who received the same grades but had good problem-solving skills.65
The potential risks of problem-solving deficits are even more dramatic when
suicide is considered. Weak problem-solving abilities are frequently
characteristic of persons who are at risk for suicide or who have committed
suicide. 66 A study found that, relative to non-suicidal psychiatric patients, suicidal

61.

HEATHER STRANG ET AL., EXPERIMENTS IN RESTORATIVE POLICING: A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE

CANBERRA REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING EXPERIMENTS (RISE) 7-28, 81-82 tbls.5.17-5.20 (1999), available at

http://www.aic.gov.au/rjustice/rise/progress/999.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
62. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989); UMBREIT, supra note
23; HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE (1990); Braithwaite, supra
note 14, passim.

63.
64.
events.
65.

See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994).
Spence et al., supra note 60. There was no relationship if the individual experienced no negative life
Michael J. Priester & George A. Clum, Perceived Problem-Solving Ability as a Predictor of

Depression, Hopelessness, and Suicide Ideation in a College Population, 40 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 79

(1993).
66.

See, e.g., Christianne L. Esposito & George A. Clum, Social Support and Problem Solving as

Moderators of the Relationship Between Childhood Abuse and Suicidality: Applications to a Delinquent
Population, 15 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 137 (2002); Debra A. Tisdell & Janet S. St. Lawrence, Adolescent
InterpersonalProblem-SolvingSkill Training: Social Validation and Generalization, 19 BEHAV. THERAPY 171
(1988).
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patients performed significantly worse on the "Alternative Uses Test," a measure
of divergent thinking, as well as on measures of the ability to solve interpersonal
problems.67 Suicidal patients were also more cognitively rigid. When asked to
evaluate their potential solutions to problems, such patients generated a greater
number of negative consequences and had difficulty implementing some of the
solutions that they chose. However, training in problem-solving skills can be
effective for those individuals at risk for suicide. One study found that selfpoisoning patients who were randomly assigned to a focused training program
did better than a control group on problem-solving ability, perceived ability to
cope with ongoing problems, and desirable forms of self-perception. 6 These
advantages persisted at a six-month follow-up, and most importantly, the group
trained in problem-solving was much less likely than the control group to have
attempted suicide again.69
All of the above studies demonstrate the relationship between problemsolving difficulties and mental-health problems. Although there is a dearth of
empirical data on the quality of solutions generated by participants in either
litigation or restorative justice,7 ° the theoretical arguments in support of the
problem-solving/mental-health relationship are legion. The common focus of
these arguments is that restorative justice,7 like other forms of alternative dispute
resolution, 72 is a collaborative problem-solving exercise in which participants are
assisted by a competent facilitator in: (1) defining the -problem (e.g., separating
positions and interests); (2) coming up with creative alternatives; and (3)
evaluating those alternatives. These practices are essentially identical to those
taught in problem-solving programs for persons at risk for psychological
problems. This unmistakable similarity between restorative processes and mental
health interventions leads us to believe that the problem-solving focus of
restorative justice may have a direct salutary effect on mental health.
Potential Benefits of Greater Social Integration. The two predictors of
mental health that have been discussed so far, perceived control and problemsolving skills, are essentially characteristics of isolated individuals. However,
many psychological problems-and potential solutions-are more socially
oriented. For instance, based on both contemporary theorizing and past clinical

David E. Schotte & George A. Clum, Problem-Solving Skills in Suicide Psychiatric Patients, 55 J.
49 (1987).
68. Breda C. McLeavey et al., InterpersonalProblem-Solving Skills Training in the Treatment of SelfPoisoning Patients,24 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 382 (1994).
69. Respectively, ten percent versus twenty-five percent. Id.
70. There is one possible, indirect exception: Participants in restorative justice are generally more
satisfied with the proposed outcome to their dilemma than are participants in litigation. See, e.g., ROBERT C.
67.

CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.

DAVIS ET AL., MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION AS ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTION IN FELONY ARREST CASES:

AN EVALUATION OF THE BROOKLYN DISPUTE RESOLUTION CENTER (FIRST YEAR) (1980).
71. See, e.g., UMBREIT, supra note 23; ZEHR, supranote 62.

72.
FOLGER,

See, for example, the transformative approach to the mediation of community disputes in BUSH &
supra note 63.
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interviews, Thomas Scheff has argued that depression is rooted not only in
biological and characterological components but also an individual's sense of
shame and alienation from social communities.73 More recent empirical support
for this claim comes from the suicide literature, with at-risk persons tending to
lack positive social support.74 The absence of the buffering effects of social
integration can render a person especially susceptible to the pressures of
everyday life. A lack of support for criminal defendants can become even more
challenging due to the high levels of stress that offenders commonly face in
court.
Restorative justice may be particularly well suited to create the positive
social support that these individuals frequently lack. Restorative practices are
inherently social in nature and require the active, supportive involvement of at
least three people (e.g., victim, offender, and facilitator) and possibly dozens
more (in certain forms of family group conferencing or circle sentencing). The
best examples of how restorative processes can encourage social integration and
support may come from the RISE study, which found that offenders in
conferences as compared to those in courts were much more likely to report that
they had experienced "reintegrative shame. ' 75 Although at first glance shaming
may appear to be a universally negative phenomenon that would only increase
social alienation, shaming that is self-consciously reintegrative (rather than
stigmatizing) has the ability to express disapproval for criminal behaviors without
communicating contempt for the offender. In other words, it censures the crime
within a framework of respect and a circle of care, inviting the offender to join
the law-abiding community. 76 As such, this evidence fits relatively well with the
theoretical arguments that focus on the socially involved nature of restorative
practices. In turn, the psychiatric data support the notion that increased social
involvement and integration should reduce mental health problems.
Potential Benefits of Greater Procedural Justice. Finally, the notion of
procedural justice may also play an important role in the link between
restorativism and mental health. Procedural justice, or the perceived fairness of
the process by which a decision is reached,7 has become a prominent topic of

73. Thomas J. Scheff, Shame and Community: Social Components in Depression, 64 PSYCHIATRY 212
(2001).
74. See, e.g., Esposito & Clum, supra note 66; Elaine A. Thompson et al., Mediating Effects of an
IndicatedPrevention Programfor Reducing Youth Depression and Suicide Risk Behaviors, 30 SUICIDE & LIFETHREATENING BEHAV. 252 (2000).
75. STRANG ET AL., supra note 61, at 64-65 tbls.4.37-4.40 (finding that restorative processes increased:
expressions of reintegrative shame; disapproval of the type of offense; disapproval of the offender's actions;
support given to offender at treatment; expressions of respect for offender; perceptions that the offender was
treated as someone loved; approval of the offender as a person; and perceptions that the offender could put the
offense behind him).
76. For a complete discussion, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989).
77. This emphasis on procedures stands in contrast to the perceived fairness of the outcome of the
decision, which is addressed under the rubric of distributive justice. See, e.g., MORTON DEUTSCH,
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (1985); Morton Deutsch, Equity, Equality,
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social psychological and organizational research as well as a familiar concept to
many legal scholars. Although early theories described procedural justice as a
way to ensure favorable outcomes over the long run,78 more recent accounts have
focused on social worthY. Specifically, decision procedures can communicate
important information about standing (i.e., whether the affected person is seen as
a valued member of the group), neutrality (i.e., whether the decision-maker is
biased for or against the affected person), and trust (i.e., whether the decisionmaker will take into consideration the particular needs of the affected person).
Evidence of a direct link comes from a large-scale study of nearly 1800
female hospital employees that examined whether mental health of this sample
population was shaped by procedural justice.' Two years after completing the
original questionnaires, employees who had reported low levels of procedural
justice-that is, decision-making procedures were inconsistent, closed,
uncorrectable, and excluded input from affected parties-were nearly twice as
likely to develop new psychiatric disorders. Moreover, empirical evidence
already associates restorative programs with increased procedural justice. As
mentioned above, data from several existing studies showed that, compared to
those in court, participants in restorative justice were more likely to feel that they
were treated equitably, that the mediator was evenhanded, that the criminal
justice system was fair, that they were able to tell their story, and that their
opinions were adequately considered.' All of the above are important elements
of procedural justice. In sum, the implication of the empirical findings and
theoretical arguments is that restorative justice can boost perceived control,
problem-solving skills, social integration, and perceptions of procedural justice,
each of which has a documented connection with mental health.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: BARRIERS

The theory and principles of restorativism can be tremendously stimulating,
forcing punishment philosophers and criminal justice actors alike to reevaluate
their own intellectual commitments and the virtues and vices of their chosen
sentencing methodologies. The specific restorative practices themselves offer
non-adversarial, context-sensitive, holistic approaches that integrate those most
directly impacted by crime in a dialogic, consensus-based decision-making

and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES
137 (1975).
78. See, e.g.,
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79. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
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EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992).
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process on how to address an offense and its future consequences. Moreover, the
data show consistent, empirically verified cognitive, affective, and behavioral
benefits from restorativism, and there are good grounds to believe that restorative
justice may also be able to improve mental health. With the Supreme Court's
decision in Booker, the federal criminal justice system has been provided a
golden opportunity to incorporate restorative practices into its sentencing
scheme. To be sure, the realization of restorative justice in United States district
courts will face significant barriers. Many of these concerns apply to the adoption
of restorativism in any jurisdiction and have already been addressed in the
literature. 2 Nevertheless, we will conclude by briefly examining a few of the
obstacles to restorative justice in a post-Booker federal system.
To begin with, there are obvious limits to the empirical data we have
presented. It must be remembered that the results reported are aggregates, and, of
course, it would be absurd to argue that restorative justice always works as
promised, just as it would be to suggest the same for litigation. Restorative
programs have occasionally produced shocking miscarriages of justice, serving
as strong negative examples.83 One of the most thoughtful proponents, John
Braithwaite, takes these exceptions to heart and discusses in detail (in his
"Pessimistic Account") the theory and data behind important objections, such as
the claim that restorative justice can increase fears of revictimization or that it is
ineffective at reducing crime. 4 But he also sees the many potential advantages (in
his "Optimistic Account") as sufficient to warrant hope and continued efforts to
develop restorative practices. 8 The conflict between these accounts, however,
presents an obstacle that can be overcome only through empiricism:
None of the problems in the Pessimistic Account is satisfactorily solved.
None of the claims in the Optimistic Account is satisfactorily
demonstrated. Decades of research and design on restorative justice
processes will be needed to explore my suspicion that the propositions of
both the Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts are right. For the moment,
we can certainly say that the literature reviewed here does demonstrate
both the promise and the perils of restorative justice. It is, however, an
immature literature, short on... rigorous or nuanced empirical research,
far too dominated by self-serving comparisons of "our kind" of
restorative justice program with "your kind" without collecting data (or
even having observed "your kind" in action). That disappoints when the
panorama of restorative justice programs around the globe is now so

82. See, e.g., Allison Morris & Warren Young, Reforming CriminalJustice: The Potentialof Restorative
Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY To PRACTICE 11 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds.,
2000); Braithwaite, supra note 14, at 5; Luna, supra note 15, at 234-42, 246-50.
83. See, e.g., Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 21, at 298-300.
84. Braithwaite, supra note 14, at 79-104.
85. Id. at 19-79, 104-07.
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dazzling, when we have so much to learn from one another's contextual
mistakes and triumphs 6
Although our review of the data supports the conclusion that restorative
justice has numerous benefits, Braithwaite's warning is well taken. The argument
that restorative practices can ameliorate mental health problems among offenders
is still speculative. What is needed is high-quality, representative research that
can directly address these significant possibilities-for example, by adding
commonly used, valid measures of depression, anxiety, and other
psychopathologies to evaluations of restorative justice programs. Such data could
then be combined across studies that use different samples and methods,
providing a more reliable and complete picture of the mental health
consequences of restorative justice.
Even accepting our own admittedly "optimistic account" of the data, nonempirical questions will remain about the possibility of federal restorative justice,
such as the very practical issues of program selection and implementation. For
instance, which of the various models should be employed in the federal system?
Victim-offender mediation has the longest track record in the United States and
may be the most manageable of the models detailed above. It also has some
similarities to the civil mediation programs already existing in state and federal
courts. Family group conferencing expands the potential participants and can be
exceptionally valuable in providing a type of moral education and preventing
anti-social behavior. Moreover, this model has been incorporated by the juvenile
justice systems of a few states and extensively used by other common law
nations, offering helpful examples in jurisdictions with similar legal structures or
a shared jurisprudential heritage. Circle sentencing is the most inclusive of the
models. The emphasis on community participation corresponds nicely with the
concepts and practices falling under the heading of "community justice, ' 87 and
because it is derived in part from tribal customs, circle sentencing seems like an
ideal methodology for federal crimes committed on Native American
reservations. Given each model's advantages and disadvantages, the best
approach for federal restorative justice might be to create a "menu"88 of
alternatives rather than picking one or another, permitting criminal justice actors
to select an appropriate process based on the facts and circumstances of the case
at hand.
A related issue concerns the precise format or procedures to be utilized and
the individual or group that will organize and facilitate restorative programs. As
for the former, federal officials can be assured that there is a vast body of

86.

Id. at 107.

87. TODD R. CLEAR & DAVID R. KARP, THE COMMUNITY JUSTICE IDEAL: PREVENTING CRIME AND
ACHIEVING JUSTICE (1999); Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.

359, 381-82 (2005).
88. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 21, at 13.
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material on the various models, complemented by restorative justice
organizations, conferences, training sessions, videos, and so ong-some of it
sponsored by and/or available from the United States Department of Justice!90 It
should also be noted that effective restorative justice procedures will not be rigid
and formulaic like traditional sentencing; instead, they will be flexible in nature
and able to adjust to the endless diversity of cases, providing the participants a
level of process control that meets their needs while empowering and investing
them in the interaction and outcome. As for coordinating and facilitating the
programs, the federal system could hire experienced mediators or contract with
some outside organization to provide this service. An interesting option with
potential returns extending beyond the programs themselves, however, would be
to train federal probation officers to be the organizers and facilitators of
mediations, conferences, circles, et cetera.
Prior to the Guidelines-era, probation officers were often educated as social
workers and came at their position from a social-work perspective. They were
neither law enforcement agents representing the government nor private
detectives for the defense, but instead tasked as neutral evaluators and advisors to
the judicial branch with the objective of providing information to the trial judge
that would help him determine an appropriate sentence.9 Under the Guidelines,
however, probation officers have been foisted into the position of quasi-gumshoe,
investigating crime and reaching factual conclusions about the offense and
offender-and as a result, they have been criticized as being advocates for the
prosecution or the defense, 92 or even as a "third adversary" in the process. 93

89. See, e.g., Austl. Gov't, Austl. Inst. of Criminology, Restorative Justice, http://www.aic.gov.au/
rjustice/index.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Austl. Nat'l Univ., Centre
for Restorative Justice, http://www.crj.anu.edu.au/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review); Fresno Pac. Univ., Center for Peacemaking and Conflict Studies, http://fresno.edu/pacs/ (last visited Sept.
18, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Prison Fellowship Int'l, Restorative Justice Online,
http://www.restorativejustice.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Real
Justice, http://www.realjustice.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Simon
Fraser Univ., Centre for Restorative Justice, http://www.sfu.ca/cfrj/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review); Univ. of Minn. Center for Restorative Justice and Peacemaking, http://rjp.umn.edu (last
visited Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Victim Offender Mediation Ass'n, Home Page,
http://www.voma.org/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
90. See, e.g., OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
GUIDE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE BALANCED AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE MODEL, http://www.ojjdp.ncjrs.org/
pubs/implementing/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Cmty. Justice Inst.,
Fla. Atd. Univ., The Balanced and Restorative Justice Project, http://www.barjproject.org/ (last visited Sept. 18,
2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Nat'l Inst. of Justice, Restorative Justice On-Line Notebook,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/publications/rest-just/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2006) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
91. See, e.g., Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine,
97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1635, 1672-73 (2003); see also Sharon M. Bunzel, The Probation Officer and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Strange PhilosophicalBedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 934 (1995).
92. See, e.g., Robert H. Edmunds, Jr., Analyzing the Tension Between Prosecutors and Probation
Officers Over "Fact Bargaining," 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 318 (1996); J. Vincent Romero, The Relationship
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Federal probation officers were also expected to become experts at the
convoluted rules of the Guidelines, transforming social workers into "bean
counters" who plug and chug numbers in a punishment equation; 94 worse yet,
they were sometimes called upon to cook the books, so to speak, fudging the
calculations or ignoring certain facts in order to achieve a specific sentence. 95 It is
little wonder that they often expressed dismay over their duties under the
mandatory Guidelines, and Booker may free them from some of the tomfoolery.
But serving as organizers and facilitators of restorative programs would provide
probation officers an opportunity to further distance themselves from adversarial
postures and strange calculations, and to return to the neutral, non-adversarial,
and advisory roles of social work.
This last point, however, raises another obstacle: the hesitance of those
within the federal criminal justice system to consider a challenge to the status
quo represented by restorative justice. It can be argued that a generation of
probation officers have lived under the Guidelines regime, "and, unlike their
senior counterparts who entered the field with a social work perspective, they
have a distinctly law-and-order approach to their work., 9 6 Federal prosecutors
and defense attorneys are adversarial by profession, schooled in the art of legal
combat, and they too may be reluctant to consider an alternative that strays from
the standard battle model of criminal justice. Judges may be more open to
restorativism, although they were trained as attorneys as well, and anyone who
took the bench after 1987 has spent his entire judicial career under the dictates of
the Guidelines.
Criminal justice actors may also express doubts about the applicability of
restorative justice to the regular business of the federal system. Many restorative
programs have focused on juvenile offenders, a rarity in United States district
courts, while the federal criminal docket is filled with victimless crimes, namely,
non-violent drug offenses.97 In turn, some have argued that "restorative justice
would not work in federal court because most of the offenders are too

Between Defense Counsel and the ProbationOfficer Under the Guidelines, II FED. SENT'G REP. 312 (1999);
Stephen R. Sady, Eliminating the AdversarialRole of the ProbationOffice, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 28 (1995).
93. Jerry D. Denzlinger & David E. Miller, The Federal Probation Officer: Life Before and After
Guideline Sentencing, 55 FED. PROBATION 49, 50-51 (1991).

94.

See, e.g., Eugene D. Natali, The Probation Officer, Bean Counting, and Truth in Sentencing, 4 FED.

SENT'G REP. 102 (1991).

95. See, e.g., Probation Officers Advisory Group Survey, 8 FED. SENT'G REP. 303 (1996); Nancy J.
King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293
(2005); Natali, supra note 94.
96. Felicia Sarner, "Fact Bargaining" Under the Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of the Probation
Department,8 FED. SENT'G REP. 328, 330 (1996).
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See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
419 tbl.5.18 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 SOURCEBOOK] (citing 0.9% of federal convictions
involving defendants eighteen years old or younger); id. at 388 tbl.4.33 (citing 28.5% of federal arrests
involving drug violations).
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manipulative." 98 Moreover, restorative justice may be seen as incompatible with
the Guidelines' target of uniformity in sentencing, instead producing the type of
unwarranted disparities among offenders that the federal regime was intended to
prevent.' And given that more than ninety percent of those convicted in federal
court are incarcerated,1m an outcome typically perceived as inconsistent with
restorativism, some might question whether restorative programs will have any
relevance for the vast majority of federal cases.
To us, at least, an unwillingness to consider restorative justice because
criminal justice actors have become habituated to the standard sentencing hearing
under the Guidelines---or, even worse, due to a lust for adversarial combatcannot be deemed legitimate. Such arguments are not valid justifications but poor
excuses that, in fact, may never be aired (because the relevant actors recognize
them to be self-serving) and instead may be hidden behind some other claims that
have the veneer of respectability. To counter these obstacles, whether
acknowledged or concealed, legal reformers and restorative justice activists will
need to engage judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and probation officers,
attempting to educate them about the feasibility and benefits of restorativism in
the federal system. As just mentioned, a wealth of resources exists to aid this
endeavor, backed by motivated supporters to participate in a campaign for federal
restorative justice. Another possible solution is to influence the cradle of legal
professionals and the main source of legal scholarship, the American law
school-a process that may have begun, with the advent of new courses, recent
law review symposia, and clinical initiatives on restorative justice. '
Concern about the applicability of restorativism to the majority of federal
cases deserves a full response, which, unfortunately, is far more than can be
provided here. But we would note that although restorative justice has been
utilized to a large extent with juvenile offenders, there have been successful adult
programs around the world and even in the United States. Contrary to the old
adage, you can teach old dogs new tricks; many adult offenders can become lawabiding and desire to make amends, and restorative practices may prove to be

98. Laura Hancock, U. Symposium Targeting 'Restorative Justice,' DESERET MORNING NEWS (Salt
Lake City, Utah), Mar. 23, 2002, at B5 (paraphrasing federal Judge Ronald N. Boyce).
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important contributors to their success. 2 We also doubt that offenders in the
federal criminal process are by nature more calculating or devious than those in
the state systems, and thus less likely to be genuinely moved by restorative
justice. Individuals find themselves in United States district courts for any
number of reasons-by committing crimes on federal lands or due to unique
jurisdiction provided by congressional statute, for instance, or just for infuriating
some federal official (a very real but unspoken impetus)-and not necessarily
because their
offenses are especially conniving or represent incorrigible
03
criminality.
Moreover, programs like victim-offender mediation have been employed
with major offenses and crimes of violence." Some leading proponents have
contended "that restorative justice should be used in serious cases," and they
"would not exclude the use of restorative processes for any offences where the
parties wished to use them."'' 5 Still, there is a powerful argument that cases
involving domestic abuse, sex offenses, or severe violence (e.g., homicide) may
not be suitable candidates for restorative programs, although a refusal to apply
restorative justice to such cases would not undermine its value in responding to
other offenses such as property crimes. Indeed, restorative justice may be a
powerful means to deal with a special class of federal offender, the white-collar
criminal: In a restorative program, he must confront and listen to the victims of

102. As an anecdote, consider Charles Colson, the White House official who was convicted and
sentenced for his involvement in the Watergate scandal. After his release, Colson went on to found the Prison
Fellowship Ministries, the world's largest outreach program to present and former prisoners, crime victims, and
their families. Among other things, he has been an outspoken supporter of restorative justice. See Charles W.
Colson, Truth, Justice, Peace: The Foundations of Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Chuck
Colson & Pat Nolan, Prescriptionfor Safer Communities, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 387
(2004).
103. Cf Erik Luna, The OvercriminalizationPhenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703 (1998) (discussing,
interalia, the expansion and far-reaching consequences of federal criminal justice).
104. See, e.g., THE FOUR CIRCLES OF HOLLOW WATER (1997), available at http://www.sgc.gc.ca/
publications/abor corrections/199703 e.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reporting a well-known
restorative justice intervention for sexual abuse); Caren L. Flaten, Victim Offender Mediation: Application with
Serious Offences Committed by Juveniles, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 25, at 387-401 (case
studies of seven serious cases, including manslaughter); TIM ROBERTS, EVALUATION OF THE VICTIM OFFENDER
BC: FINAL REPORT (1995) (addressing cases of armed robbery, sexual assault,
and murder); TANYA A. RUGGE & ROBERT B. CORMIER, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN CASES OF SERIOUS CRIMES: AN
EVALUATION (2003), available at www.sfu.ca/cfrj/fulltext/rugge.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review);
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ExSum TX OHVOD CSV.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Mark Umbreit et al., Victims of
Severe Violence Meet the Offender: Restorative Justice Through Dialogue, 6 INT'L J. VICIMOLOGY 321 (1999)
(case studies with violent crimes); Mark S. Umbreit & Kathy Brown, Victims of Severe Violence Meet the Offender
in Ohio, 3 CRIME VICTIM REP. 40 (1999) (case studies with violent crimes); Mark S. Umbreit & Betty Vos,
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his offense and hear the harm that it has caused, rather than simply enter into
another business-like transaction via a formulaic guilty plea and abstract
sentencing hearing.0 6
As for drug cases in United States district courts, restorative programs may
still have application to offenses without discernible victims. For example,
foreign nations have utilized conferencing for the "victimless" crime of drunk
driving, with the offender confronted by the potential consequences of his
actions-most importantly, injuring or killing another motorist or a pedestrian."7
A similar methodology might be employed for drug offenders, with a restorative
program emphasizing the impact of drug crime on family members, friends,
neighbors, and the larger communities, possibly with the participation of those
who have been
negatively affected by drugs (e.g., a parent whose child died of an
08
overdose).
The prime focus of criticism, however, may be the issue of uniformity.
Specifically, some might argue that restorative justice generates disparities in
punishment between similarly situated offenders, thereby violating a central goal
of the Guidelines. Yet such concerns will tend to be reflexive and unfounded,
premised on the "myth"" of uniform federal sentencing. As mentioned earlier
and discussed at length elsewhere,"0 the Guidelines incorporate a limited number
of factors-often privileging certain objective criteria, like the quantity of drugs
sold or amount of money embezzled-but then marginalize or ignore other
seemingly relevant factors, such as an offender's youth or the fear instilled in a
victim. Conversely, peculiar distinctions and slight factual changes can
drastically alter an individual's sentence; whether a defendant occupied a
"leadership" versus "managerial" role in a criminal scheme or possessed 5.01
grams of crack cocaine rather than 4.99 grams, for instance, can produce
significant variations in punishment. Moreover, the complex and rigid strictures
of the Guidelines fostered an environment of systematic evasion by criminal
justice actors, with attorneys, judges, and probation officers playing fast-andloose with the "facts" to obtain desired outcomes. Although these and other
problems cannot be fully detailed here, it suffices to say that the Guidelines have
hardly produced uniform punishment in any meaningful sense.
106. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 14 (discussing benefits of restorative justice and reintegrative
shaming for white-collar and regulatory offenders).
107.
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As such, it might be tempting to glibly assert that restorative justice (or some
other alternative) cannot make disparity in the federal system much worse. The
better argument, however, is that restorativism may not only be compatible with
concerns animating the drive for uniformity, it may generate a deeper conception
of equality than currently obtainable under the Guidelines alone."' Federal
sentencing sorts real events and individuals into abstract groups for mechanical
calculations and, in the process, eliminates most of the distinctive aspects of the
offense and affected parties. The Guidelines thus ignore the truism of life that no
two crimes are exactly alike; there is a background and foreground to every event
that can be disregarded only at the expense of dehumanizing that which is
inextricably human. By treating as identical all criminals who fit within certain
prefabricated categories (e.g., some amount of ill-gotten proceeds), the system
necessarily overlooks the human element of crime: What inspired the offender to
sell drugs on a street corner? What have been the consequences for the bank
teller who had a gun pointed in his face? What are the lingering effects for a
neighborhood poisoned by environmental waste? What is the impact of the
offense and potential punishment on the families of the victim and offender?
Does the offender feel genuine remorse and want to make amends for his
wrongdoing? What is needed to set things right for the victim and community?
These and other highly relevant issues distinguishing one case from another
often receive little if any attention under the Guidelines. In contrast, restorative
justice incorporates affected parties into a dialogic process that allows key
questions to be asked and important concerns to be addressed, all in pursuit of a
sentence that actually fits the crime and criminal and serves the needs of the
victim and community. Restorativism's conception of equality, based on realworld consideration of concrete events and the participation of concerned
individuals, appears to us to be more meaningful than the mechanical equality
provided by the Guidelines. Needless to say, restorative programs must be
subject to review, guaranteeing that an outcome conforms to the law and falls
within the general range of sentences in similar cases. As suggested earlier, a
United States district court would evaluate the restorative plan-along with the
arguments of counsel, in-court statements of relevant participants, information
about previous cases, and the judge's own knowledge of the present
proceedings-in reaching an appropriate punishment. The federal courts as
neutral, repeat-players in the criminal justice system could thus ensure that
restorative plans meet the various matters of justice that inform sentencing. So
conceived, we would argue that federal restorative justice offers a richer
conception of equality, one cognizant of true-life differences among cases and
affected individuals, without exacerbating the disparities perpetuated by the
Guidelines regime.
111.For insightful analysis of whether restorative justice is consistent with various conceptions of
uniformity, see Michael O'Hear, Is Restorative Justice Compatible With Sentencing Uniformity?, 89 MARQ. L.
REV. 305 (2005); see also Luna, supra note 15.
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Nor do we believe that the federal system's heavy reliance on incarceration
would necessarily preclude restorative programs. Certainly, many (if not most) of
those who support substantive restorativism reject the preoccupation with
imprisonment in retributive- and utilitarian-based sentencing, and they may well
be horrified by the exploitation of their espoused processes in setting prison
terms. Nonetheless, it can be argued that incarceration is American society's
chosen medium to broadcast an unambiguous denouncement of the criminal and
his crime, with all other sanctions offering a less condemnatory message. This
problem of "punishment incommensurability," ' 2 as Dan Kahan has described it,
may mean that anything short of imprisonment will be considered insufficient by
the public. Moreover, Sara Sun Beale has identified a series of obstacles to the
adoption of restorative justice in America, including a general perception that
harsh sentences reduce crime, the media's incessant and fear-provoking coverage
of crime stories, and the political reward to elected officials from supporting
draconian penalties." 3 There may even be some people who so viscerally despise
offenders that they actively desire the imposition of physical and psychological
pain that accompanies incarceration-more or less, "those criminals deserve
whatever they get in prison""14-and presumably this group would be indifferent
to (or even disapprove of) the potential mental health benefits from restorative
justice programs. Against this background, there is every reason to believe
incarceration will remain a (if not the) core component of federal sanctioning for
the foreseeable future.
This is descriptive and predictive, not normative-we find it disheartening
that the United States may continue to lock-up a vast number of its own citizenry,
sentenced not just to a loss of freedom but also the violence and depravity of
correctional institutions."' Even so, if restorative justice is to be anything other
than a trivial practice in United States district courts, imprisonment will have to
be countenanced as part of punishment. In some cases, there may be no choice
but incarceration, a point conceded by some leading restorative justice advocates
from foreign nations with far smaller prison populations." 6 And even if a

112. Dan M. Kahan, Punishment Incommensurability, 1 BUFF. CRIM L. REV. 691, 692-93 (1998).
113. Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospectsfor Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003
UTAH L. REV 413, 423-34 (2003) [hereinafter Beale, Still Tough]; see also Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to
Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of
(Federal) CriminalLaw, I BUFF. CRIM L. REV. 23 (1997).
114. Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 140 (2006) (paraphrasing
attitude of some toward prison rape).
115. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Reflections on Crime and Punishment, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 681, 683-92
(1997) (criticizing deplorable prison conditions); J.C. Oleson, The Punitive Coma, 90 CAL. L. REV. 829, 849-61
(2002) (detailing antisocial environment of correctional facilities); see also Ristroph, supra note 114 (analyzing
issue of sexual punishment in prison); James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The Supreme
Court and Sexual Terrorism in Prison, 81 N.C. L. REV. 433 (2003) (describing sexual terrorism in prisons).
116. See, e.g., Morris & Young, supra note 82, at 16 ("[I1n fact, any outcome-including a prison
sentence--can be restorative if it is an outcome agreed to and considered appropriate by the key parties. For
example, it might be agreed that a prison sentence is required in a particular situation to protect society, to

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37
"values" conception of restorativism assails the apparent incarcerative
commitment of retributive and utilitarian theories and practices, a procedural
conception of restorative justice would invite all decent punishment philosophies
to the table and would not foreclose any viable sentencing options, including
imprisonment."7 Moreover, it seems possible that the implementation of
restorative programs in the federal system, despite (or even because of) the
inclusion of prison terms, could slowly alter the professional and lay mentality
about sentencing alternatives for the better, as people are forced to reconsider
their opinions about the propriety of relying upon mass incarceration as a public
policy."'
Restorative justice would remain unacceptable for punishment sadists,
however, given its emphasis on healing rather than hurting, and quite frankly,
there is not much that can be said to individuals who enjoy the infliction of pain
on others. Yet there may be some who question the improvement of an offender's
mental health via restorative justice, not out of a desire for schadenfreude, but
based on doubts about any programmatic gain for the law-abiding public. To put
it more bluntly, why should society care about the well-being of offenders at all?
For many people, the improvement of an offender's--or any person's-mental
health will be a worthy end in and of itself, but others will need to see benefits
beyond those that accrue to the individual who committed the underlying crime.
Although it is not possible to go into a full discussion here, a few general lines of
argument bear on this issue.
The first is the staggering financial burden on the public due to poor mental
health among offenders. For example, the mentally ill can cost up to two-and-ahalf times more to incarcerate per year" 9-a price tag that has only grown in the
past few decades, with jails and prisons picking up new residents as mental
institutions have decreased their populations, leading to unusually large numbers
of inmates with psychiatric disorders.2 This expense is coupled with the obvious
fact that if an offender (whether mentally ill or not) is incarcerated, then he is not
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earning an income outside of the penal complex and will likely receive a
diminished salary upon release.' 2' Such information could make proper treatment
for offenders economically attractive to even the most recalcitrant policy-makers.
Second, although it is common to feel contempt for offenders and pity for
victims, there is substantial overlap between the two supposedly distinct
populations. 22 The categories are not mutually exclusive, and it would be wrong
to place all of our affections in inappropriately reified classes of "pure offenders"
and "pure victims." Instead, mental health benefits to offenders may also be
mental health benefits to many crime victims. Finally, as demonstrated by social
psychologist Stanley Milgram's classic research on the "six degrees of
separation,"'2 3 we are all connected, directly or indirectly. Inasmuch as few
people would show callous disregard for the welfare of their friends or family,
we should be concerned for others' well-being even when the connection is not
immediately clear.
Undoubtedly, many questions remain to be answered about restorative justice
in America, and many obstacles exist between the concept of federal restorative
justice and its realization in United States district courts. We are optimistic, not
nafve, and we fully recognize that criticisms about restorative justice must be
aired and discussed in depth. As Professor Braithwaite notes, a thoughtful
critique "helps us to be systematic in accounting for the negatives," and the
interaction between advocacy and critique "is the stuff of the most productive
intellectual work.', 2 4 At the same time, we must be "careful not to kill fertile
ideas in the womb,"'' 25 particularly those like restorative justice that challenge the
status quo and may face a level of system inertia or even professional
intransigence. Restorativism certainly cannot solve all of the criminal justice
problems America faces today, but it may be a good start. And thanks to Booker,
the benefits of restorative justice could be part of a brighter future for federal
sentencing.
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